uss liberty incident

Vessel details can be found in the USS Liberty (AGTR-5) article.

USS Liberty was an US Navy intelligence ship which was attacked in international waters near the Sinai Peninsula, north of El Arish, by Israeli fighter planes and torpedo boats on June 8, 1967 during the Six-Day War between Israel and the Arab States. In all, 34 American servicemen were killed and 172 wounded in the attack. Israel maintains that the incident was entirely due to error, which the US government has formally accepted. Israel contends it was assured by the United States that no US ships were in the area and that its air and naval forces wrongly identified the Liberty at various stages as a Russian intelligence ship providing information to the Arabs or as the Egyptian vessel "El Quseir," which is a horse carrier one-fourth the size of the Liberty. The United States and Israel exchanged diplomatic notes after several inquiries, and the US accepted an indemnity of $13 million. Surviving crew members, as well as a number of Western observers and former US government officials (including then CIA director Richard Helms), and then-Secretary of State Dean Rusk assert that the attack was premeditated and deliberate and that Israel knew the ship was American. This incident stands as the only peacetime attack on a US naval vessel not investigated by Congress. The survivors want a full Congressional hearing; they hold that a proper investigation has never taken place and that all previous reports are incomplete, mention the incident in passing, and either that they are intended to exonerate Israel or that they do not even question the culpability of the attack (instead, they hold, it focuses on other topics, such as American communication problems). Among the theories presented as to why Israel carried out this action is that Israel may have been trying to get the US involved in the conflict on Israel's side, by convincing the US that Egypt was the aggressor.

Background

USS Liberty (AGTR-5) was originally the 7,725-ton (light) civilian cargo ship Simmons Victory. She was acquired by the United States Navy, converted to an Auxiliary Technical Research Ship (AGTR), and began her first deployment in 1965, to waters off the west coast of Africa. She carried out several more operations during the next two years. During the Six-Day War between Israel and the Arab nations, she was sent to collect electronic intelligence in the eastern Mediterranean. On June 4, the day before the start of the Six-Day War, Israel asked if the United States had any ships in the region. The United States responded that it did not -- and it didn't, since the United States was just entering the Mediterranean Sea at this time. In addition, five messages had been sent to Liberty warning it to come no closer than 100 miles to the Sinai coast. These messages were not received. On June 5, at the start of the war, the Liberty was already in the eastern Mediterranean. Captain William L. McGonagle of the Liberty immediately asked Vice Admiral William I. Martin at the Sixth Fleet headquarters to send a destroyer to accompany the Liberty and serve as its armed escort and an auxiliary communications center. The following day, June 6, Admiral Martin replied: Liberty is a clearly marked United States ship in international waters, not a participant in the conflict and not a reasonable subject for attack by any nation. Request denied. He promised, however, that, in the unlikely event of an inadvertent attack, jet fighters from the Sixth Fleet could be overhead in ten minutes. During the day preceding the attack, June 7, the ship was flown over by several aircraft. Their exact number and type is disputed; at least one was a Nord Noratlas "flying boxcar" (claimed by the survivors and confirmed by Israel); a photograph presents a C-47 Dakota and other reports speak about Mirage III jet fighters. At least some of those fly-bys were from a close range. In fact, at 6:00 A.M. Sinai (GMT +2) time that morning Israel confirmed that a Nord Noratlas identified the ship as the USS Liberty. Many Liberty crewmen given testimony that one of the aircraft flew so close to Liberty that her propellers rattled the deck plating of the ship and her pilots waved to the crew of the Liberty and her crewmen waved back. The ship left the coast of Israel in the morning hours of June 8, 1967 and travelled westwards towards the coast of the Sinai Peninsula to monitor the fighting which was taking place. On the afternoon of that day the ship was steaming at about 5 knots (9 km/h) on the boundary of international and coastal waters approximately 13 miles (21 km) off the coast of the Sinai Peninsula near El-Arish. The Israeli military had standing orders to attack any unidentified vessel near the shore. At about 2 p.m., Liberty was attacked by several aircraft, most probably two or three Mirage IIIs carrying cannon and rockets followed by Dassault Mysteres carrying napalm. Testimony of USS Liberty crew members unanimously describes the aircraft as having no identifying markings. About twenty minutes after the attack of the aircraft, the ship was approached by three torpedo boats bearing Israeli flags and identification signs. Initially, Captain McGonagle, who perceived that the torpedo boats "were approaching the ship in a torpedo launch attitude," ordered a machine gun to engage the boats. After recognizing the Israeli standard and seeing apparent morse code signalling attempts by one of the boats (but being unable to see what was being sent, due to the smoke of the fire started by the earlier aircraft attack), McGonagle gave the order to hold fire. This order was apparently misunderstood in the confusion, and two heavy machine guns opened fire. Subsequently the Israeli boats opened fire and launched at least two torpedoes at Liberty (five according to the 1982 IDF History Department report). One hit Liberty on the starboard side, forward of the superstructure, creating a large hole in what had been a former cargo hold converted to the ships research spaces causing the majority of the casualties for the incident. The torpedo boats approached Liberty and strafed crewmen (including damage control parties and sailors preparing life rafts for launch) on deck. (see below for disputed details). Eventually the torpedo boats withdrew from the area. Israel states that its aircraft crew were afraid at first that they had attacked a Soviet ship, which might bring the Soviet Union into the war. When the ship was confirmed to have been American, the torpedo boats returned to offer help; it was refused by the American ship. About three hours after the attack, Israel informed the US embassy in Tel Aviv about the incident and provided a helicopter to fly a US naval attach to the ship. Though severely damaged, with a 50 foot hole and a twisted keel, 'Liberty's crew kept her afloat, and she was able to leave the area under her own power. She was escorted to Malta by units of the US Sixth Fleet and was there given interim repairs. After these were completed in July 1967, Liberty returned to the United States. She was decommissioned in June 1968 and struck from the Naval Vessel Register. Liberty'' was transferred to US Maritime Administration (MARAD) in December 1970 and sold for scrap in 1973. Her casualties numbered 34 dead and 171 wounded.

Details in dispute

The events surrounding the attack, even very simple elements such as its duration, are a subject of fierce controversy. Among the disputed facts:

Visibility of ensign: The most vehemently debated point is the visibility of the large American flags that the ship was flying; Americans claimed that the flags were clearly visible in the wind. The Israeli pilots claimed that they were either unable to notice it altogether (possibly due to there being no wind), or considered it an Egyptian diversion aimed to mislead them. One point that is beyond dispute is that USS Liberty bore ten-foot-high markings along either bow clearly indicating her hull (or "pendant") number (AGTR-5) or the 24 inch high letters spelling the vessel's name across the stern. These marking were not cursive Arabic script, but in English.
Israeli aircraft markings: American survivors of the attack unanimously assert that the Israeli aircraft were unmarked. Israel never responded to this claim.
Jamming: An additional point on which Israel did not comment is the use of radio jamming. In the absence of reliable records, it is only left to speculate whether jamming (of Navy tactical and international maritime distress frequencies) did take place, or whether the deficiency in communications originated in the attack itself (i.e. loss of power and damage of antennas). Both Liberty and USS Saratoga radio operators reported hearing the distinctive buzzing sound usually indicative of radio frequency jamming
Probability of identification: Americans claim the thirteen closer fly-bys of the previous two days should have been sufficient for identification. Israel acknowledged that the ship had been identified as American and neutral the previous day; however it claims that at 11 a.m., the ship moved out of the status board. An hour later, when explosions were heard in El-Arish, Israel claims to have re-acquired the ship without being aware that it was the same one that was flown over the day before.
Effort for identification: The American crew claims that the attacking aircraft did not make identification runs over Liberty, but rather began to strafe immediately. One Israeli report claims several passes were made.
Speed of the vessel: According to Israeli accounts, they made (admittedly erroneous) measurements that indicated that the ship was steaming at 30 knots (56 km/h). United States and Israeli naval doctrine at the time required that a ship traveling at that speed must be presumed to be a warship. Liberty's speed was later recalculated to be 28 knots, although the top speed of the Liberty was only 17.5 knots (21 knots being attainable if the engine governors were disengaged) According to Body of Secrets, by James Bamford, and Liberty crewmen (including the Officer-of-the-Deck) the ship was steaming at 5 knots at the time of the attack.
Call for ID: Israel claims to have called the ship on radio several times without receiving an answer while the American crew members deny ever receiving a call for identification.
Visual communications: Joe Meadors, the signalman on bridge, states that "Immediately prior to the torpedo attack he was on the Signal Bridge repeatedly sending 'USS Liberty US Navy Ship' by flashing light to the torpedo boats." The Israeli boats claim to have read only the signal "AA", which was exactly the signal dispatched by the Egyptian destroyer Ibrahim Al-Awal when it was engaged by the Israeli navy eleven years earlier. Meadors claims that he never sent "AA" (which would require him to identify himself as well); this disagreement may be settled by considering the fact that Liberty was unable to read signals sent from the boats.
Israeli ships' actions after the torpedo hit: The American crew claims that after Liberty had been torpedoed, Israeli boats circled the ship shooting machine gun fire at descended (unmanned) life rafts and sailors on board the ship. Israelis claim that they recognized the ship as American immediately after it was hit and ceased fire. The former point of view was expressed by many of the crew members, while the latter one is reinforced by the statement the ship's captain had given to the Navy Court several days after the attack.
Israeli offers of help: Reports differ regarding whether the Israeli boats offered help. The crew claims that the torpedo boats simply withdrew, while the captain and the Israeli crew report that help was offered; the captain stated that he had asked the Israeli boats to stay away by the means of signal flags.
U.S. rescue attempts: At least two rescue attempts were launched from US aircraft carriers nearby but were recalled, according to David Lewis, Commander during the attack. Lewis wrote and made an audio recording about a meeting 6th Fleet Rear Admiral Lawrence Geis requested in his cabins. "He told me that since I was the senior Liberty survivor on board he wanted to tell me in confidence what had actually transpired. He told me that upon receipt of our SOS aircraft were launched to come to our assistance and then Washington was notified. He said that the Secretary of defense (Robert MacNamara) had ordered that the aircraft be returned to the carrier which was done. Radm Geis then said that he speculated that Washington may have suspected that the aircraft carried nuclear weapons so he put together another flight of conventional aircraft that had no capability of carrying nuclear weapons. These he launched to assist us and again notified Washington of his actions. Again MacNamara ordered the aircraft recalled. He requested confirmation of the order being unable to believe that Washington would let us sink. This time President Johnson ordered the recall with the comment that did not care if every many drowned and the ship sank, but that he would not embarrass his allies. This is, to the best of my ability, what I recall transpiring 30 years ago."

Subsequent inquiry

Three subsequent Israeli reports concluded that the attack was conducted because Liberty was confused with an Egyptian vessel and because of failures of communications between Israel and the US. The three Israeli commissions were:

Ram Ron Investigation
Israeli Examining Judges Investigation
IDF History Department Investigation

The Israeli government admitted that three crucial errors were made: the refreshing of the status board (nullifying the ship's classification as American), the erroneous identification of the ship as an Egyptian vessel, and the lack of notification from the returning aircraft informing Israeli headquarters of markings on the front of the hull (markings that would not be found on an Egyptian ship). As the general root of these problems, Israel blames the combination of alarm and tiredness experienced by the Israeli forces at that point of the war. Captain Ward Boston, JACG, US Navy, was the senior legal counsel of the US Navy's inquiry into the incident. He wrote this declaration with regard to the evidence and conclusions presented to the inquiry that he and Admiral Kidd, President of the US Naval Court of Inquiry, shared regarding the incident. He wrote, in part, "The evidence was clear. Both Admiral Kidd and I believed with certainty that this attack, which killed 34 American sailors and injured 172 others, was a deliberate effort to sink an American ship and murder its entire crew. Each evening, after hearing testimony all day, we often spoke our private thoughts concerning what we had seen and heard. I recall Admiral Kidd repeatedly referring to the Israeli forces responsible for the attack as murderous bastards. It was our shared belief, based on the documentary evidence and testimony we received first hand, that the Israeli attack was planned and deliberate, and could not possibly have been an accident." On December 17, 1987, the issue was officially closed by the exchange of diplomatic notes between the US and Israel. Israel also eventually paid nearly US $13 million in humanitarian reparations to the United States and in compensation to the families of the victims.

Controversy

Israel denied any accusations that the attack was deliberate using the following arguments:

The attacking aircraft used napalm and machine guns, rather ineffective armament for attacking a ship.
Liberty opened fire first on the gunboats.
Due to the aircraft attack, Liberty was covered with smoke and was unable to conduct visual communications in any way.
No adequate benefit has been put forward that the Israelis would derive from the attack on an American ship, especially considering the high cost of the predictable complications that must inevitably follow such an attack on a powerful ally.

Virtually all of the survivors of Liberty, many US government officials and many US military officers have asserted that the attack was premeditated. Jim Ennes, a junior officer (and off-going Officer of the Deck) on Liberty's bridge at the time of the attack, has published a book titled "Assault on the Liberty". Like virtually all accounts of the "Liberty" incident, it has come under heavy criticism by those disagreeing with its point of view. Ennes and Joe Meadors, another survivor of the attack, run a web site that was built "with support and encouragement from the USS Liberty Veterans Association." Meadors states that the classification of the attack as deliberate is the official policy of the association, to which all known survivors belong. Other survivors run several additional websites. Several books and a BBC documentary tried to prove that USS Liberty was attacked on purpose. They are backed in this position by some representatives of the US intelligence community. Critics claim that many of them include incorrect assumptions and use fuzzy reasoning. For example, they claim that the ship was attacked to prevent the U.S. from knowing about the forthcoming attack in the Golan Heights. When evaluating the merits of this theory, one must balance Israel's need to keep a possible war crime secret, versus the probably more serious consequences of attacking an ally. Israeli officials and Jewish organizations world-wide have complained that these materials are often used as a pretext for anti-Semitic declarations and acts. They claim that these reviews often do not give Israel the benefit of the doubt, turning the incident into a circus for Israel-bashing. Meadors and Ennes have denied an anti-Semitic pretext in their work, and have repeatedly expressed sharp disapproval at the use of the USS Liberty incident in anti-Semitic contexts. For years some people have claimed that audio tapes existed of the Israeli pilots identifying the ship as American before they attacked. There are other conspiracy claims that the Liberty radio compartment made such interceptions and that the U.S. submarine Amberjack had gathered damning evidence during the attack by means of its periscope camera. On July 2, 2003, as a result of US Florida Judge Jay Cristol lawsuit using the Freedom of Information Act, the National Security Agency made two significant admissions: that there had been no radio intercepts made by USS Liberty, and that there had been no radio intercepts made by the US submarine Amberjack. The National Security Agency released copies of the recordings it made from an EC-121 aircraft in the vicinity of the attacks during the time periods 2:30 p.m. Sinai time to 3:27 p.m. Sinai time. The NSA tapes were the last significant piece of evidence which remained classified until the decision. The English translations of those tapes are published in Appendix 2, of Judge Cristol's book "The Liberty Incident". The tapes show that the helicopters were first dispatched to rescue Egyptians, and then demonstrate the confusion as to the identification of the target ship. Cristol adds: "The tapes confirm that the helicopter pilot observed the flag at 3:12 p.m." which would coincide with the audio tapes which the Israel Air Force released to Judge Cristol of the radio transmissions before, during and after the attack On October 10, 2003, the Jerusalem Post ran an interview with Yiftah Spector, one of the pilots who participated in the attackhttp://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull&cid=1065773796483. Spector stated in the interview that the ship was assumed to be Egyptian at the time of the attack. Since the attack on the USS Liberty ten official U.S. investigations and 3 or more official Israeli investigations have concluded that the tragic event was a case of mistaken identity. http://www.israelnewsagency.com/usslibertyisrael10034.htmlHowever, critics of the Israeli government position state that for the three Israeli investigations, the fact that the attack was a mistake was a given, and that the investigations were to decide whether or not anyone in the Israeli Defense Forces should be tried on crimes (no wrongdoing was found). They also assert that five U.S. congressional investigations and four other U.S. investigations were not investigations at all, but rather reports, using evidence only from the U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry. As well, they insist that the majority of those nine U.S. reports have nothing to do with the culpability of the attack, but rather, they discuss issues such as communications failures.http://www.wrmea.com/archives/December_2003/0312014.html In their view, the U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry is the only investigation on the incident to date. They claim that it was hastily conducted, in only 10 days, even though the court’s president, Rear Admiral Isaac Kidd, said that it would take 6 months to properly conduct. Furthermore, the court's legal counsel has stepped forward and stated that Washington ordered him and Kidd to falsely report that the attack was a mistake, and his statement says that he and Kidd believed that the attack was deliberate.