|
|
|
|
|
Scientific FormalismScientific formalism is a possible term for two aspects of the presentation of science, particularly relevant to the physical sciences. On one hand, there is the question of the possibility of presenting a scientific theory in a completely formalised way, in other words, as a strict formal system. On the other hand, given a largely symbolic representation of arguments and calculations of a piece of theory, such as might appear in a scientific paper, there is the question of the content of the symbols and manipulations of them. In the first case, the formal side is possibly considered advantageous, in that a totally formalised theory has been made as precise, and its assumptions spelled out in as much detail, as one could ask. The second part relates, rather, to questions of ontology: does an electron exist in the same sense that a bacterium exists? The scientific climate of the twentieth century revived these questions. From about the time of Isaac Newton to that of James Clerk Maxwell they had been dormant, in the sense that the physical sciences could rely on the status of the real numbers as a description of the continuum, and an agnostic view of atoms and their structure. Quantum mechanics, the dominant physical theory after about 1925, was formulated in a way which raised questions of both types. In the Newtonian framework there was indeed a degree of comfort in the answers one could give. Consider for example the question of whether the Earth really goes round the Sun. In a frame of reference adapted to calculating the Earth's orbit, this is a mathematical but also tautological statement. Newtonian mechanics can answer the question, whether it is not equally the case that the Sun goes round the Earth, as it indeed appears to Earth-based astronomers. In Newton's theory there is a basic, fixed frame of reference that is inertial. The 'correct answer' is that the point of view of an observer in an inertial frame of reference is privileged: other observers see artefacts of their acceleration relative to an inertial frame. Before Newton, Galileo would draw the consequences, from the Copernican heliocentric model. He was, however, constrained to call his work (in effect) scientific formalism, under the old 'description' saving the phenomena. To avoid going against authority, the elliptic orbits of the heliocentric model could be labelled as a more convenient device for calculations, rather than an actual description of reality. In general relativity, Newton's inertial frames are no longer privileged. In quantum mechanics, Paul Dirac argued that physical models were not there to provide semantic constructs allowing us to understand microscopic physics in language comparable to that we use on the familiar scale of everyday objects. His attitude, adopted by many theoretical physicists, is that a good model is judged by our capacity to use it to calculate physical quantities that can be tested experimentally.
|
 |
|
| Copyright 2005-2009 OnPedia.com. All Rights Reserved |
|
|