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Deontology As ConsequentialismOne possible question in the debate between consequentialism and deontological ethics is whether deontology might in fact be a type of consequentialism. Under deontology, actions are supposed to be right or wrong in and of themselves, regardless of consequences; however, it can be argued that even deontological theories have an end (teleos) or 'final cause' at which they aim, and can thus be considered a type of consequentialism. An example of this would be in Natural Law presented by St. Thomas Aquinas, which is supposed to be deontological. The primary precepts of Natural Law suggest the end to which a supposed deontological action is rooted, such as the need to worship God. This underpins each and every action taken within Natural Law, which undermines its deontological status - as everything is for the 'greater glory of God' or 'self preservation and the preservation of the innocent' etc. Other examples can be found in Kant's Categorical Imperative, whereby the fulfilment of one's duty is considered to be good intrinsically and universally. Arguably, this cannot be so, as an action is deemed "good" by virtue of the imperative, and so is good by virtue of its "consequence" of satisfying the imperative. A counter-argument is that, under any type of consequentialism, the aim is to maximise good effects and minimise bad ones. But in some cases, deontology simply does not allow this. For example, a deontological theory of ethics might say that murder is wrong. If this was seen as a type of consequentialism, the aim would be to minimise the number of murders committed, even if one had to commit some murders to do this. But deontological ethics explicitly forbids this - one cannot commit a murder to prevent five murders by someone else. In response to this, it can be argued that, in non-consequentialist theories, there is not (and never can be) a satisfactory explanation as to why an action is deemed good or bad intrinsically; any explanation (e.g. "murder is wrong because life is sacred") would permit a return to consequentialism, and to simply maximising the good and minimising the bad, even if one must "break the rules" to do so. This argument ultimately turns on whether one is allowed to take subjective facts about who carries out an act into consideration - that is, whether it is worse to choose a situation where you yourself commit one murder than a situation where someone else commits five. Deontologists do argue that they are not consequentialists, precisely because they do not care what happens, but rather about who is responsible for it happening. This however does not give answer to how an action can be deemed right or wrong in and of itself. Considering a situation whereby a deontologist is made to lie either once or twice, the issue of which one they choose becomes a paradoxical matter. Should the deontologist choose to lie once instead of twice, the issue of why two lies are worse than one comes into play - and cannot be resolved without a consequence. Should a dentologist argue that one lie or two lies are neither worse nor better than each other, the consequential problem then faced is that it does not matter what option is chosen, thus rendering it unable to provide an ethical way forward. Despite all deontological ethics carrying a consequence in some form or another, one can argue that it still remains deontological, as the consequence of the action remains wholly intrinsic to the action, never seperable in any given situation, thus retaining moral absolutes that transcend all situations. In recent arguments, this has called for a reform in understanding of deontology - in that the consequences of an action within the situation does not matter, but the consequence as a direct result of the action (even when the scenario around which it is built is removed)are what deems an action right or wrong. The Categorical Imperative is argued to hold this view, as does Natural Law. Deontological ethics also cannot provide an intrinsically right or wrong "label" for all actions. For example, a deontologist could not argue that building a dam is either good or bad in and of itself and also regardless of whether "I" do it or anyone else does. To say that building the dam was right or wrong because it caused great environmental and human loss (or similarly whether it saved lives), would not be deontological, as it brings in a consequence. One could argue however, that the one action that is neither good nor bad, can only be deemed good or bad in the light of whether it violates an action already deemed right or wrong (e.g. the destruction of the environment). This would be to say "If action X brings about action Y, then action X is right/wrong" - where X is the action not deemed right or wrong, and action Y is a moral absolute. This comes close to Kant's Hypothetical Imperative, and is arguable either way that the approach is deontological or consequential, as the qualifier of the action is the consequence it brings about OR the deontologist could argue that the (bad) action of destroying the environment in order to cause the dam (so in essence, it is seen from the reverse point of view) is irrelevant - the dam would not play any part in deeming any action good or bad, as it is the consequence of an absolute. There is no consensus on this matter in either academia or the larger philosophical world. It will likely remain a point of dispute for some time.
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