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Atkins V. Virginia | bgcolor="6699FF" | Atkins v. Virginia | align="center" | 100px
Supreme Court of the United States | bgcolor="6699FF" | Argued February 20, 2002
Decided June 20, 2002 | | {| align="center" | | valign="top"|Full case name: | valign="top"|''Daryl Renard Atkins v. Virginia | | valign="top"|Citations: | valign="top"|536 U.S. 304; 122 S. Ct. 2242; 153 L. Ed. 2d 335; 2002 U.S. LEXIS 4648; 70 U.S.L.W. 4585; 2002 Cal. Daily Op. Service 5439; 2002 Daily Journal DAR 6937; 15 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 397 | | valign="top"|Prior history: | valign="top"|Defendant convicted, Circuit Court of York County, Virginia; affirmed in part, reversed in part, remanded, 510 S.E.2d 445 (Va. 1999); defendant resentenced, Circuit Court of York County; affirmed, 534 S.E.2d 312 (Va. 2000); certiorari granted, 533 U.S. 976 (2001) | | valign="top"|Subsequent history: | valign="top"|Remanded to Circuit Court, 581 S.E.2d 514 (Va. 2003) | } | | bgcolor="6699FF" | Holding | | A Virginia law allowing the execution of mentally handicapped individuals violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments. Supreme Court of Virginia reversed and remanded. | | bgcolor="6699FF" | Court membership | | {| align="center" | | Chief Justice: William Rehnquist | | Associate Justices: John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer | } | | bgcolor="6699FF" | Case opinions | | {| align="center" | | Majority by: Stevens | | Joined by: O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer | | Dissent by: Rehnquist | | Joined by: Scalia, Thomas | | Dissent by: Scalia | | Joined by: Rehnquist, Thomas | } | | bgcolor="6699FF" | Laws applied | | U.S. Const. amend. VIII, XIV | In Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) the Supreme Court of the United States (in a 6 to 3 decision) ruled that executing the mentally retarded violates the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments. The case At midnight on August 16, 1996, Daryl Atkins and his accomplice, William Jones, abducted Eric Nesbitt. They robbed him of the money on his person, then took him to an ATM and forced him to withdraw money. Afterward, they took him to an isolated location, where they shot him eight times. Nesbitt died. At trial, each man testified that the other actually pulled the trigger. The jury believed Jones over Atkins, and convicted Atkins of capital murder. During the penalty phase of the trial, the prosecution proved two aggravating factors under Virginia law -- that Atkins posed a risk of "future dangerousness," and that the offense was committed in a vile manner. In mitigation, the defense presented Atkins' school records that suggested he was "mildly mentally retarded" and the result of an IQ test that placed his score at 59. The jury sentenced Atkins to death. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the sentence based on a prior Supreme Court decision, Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989). Because of what it perceived to be a shift in the judgments of state legislatures as to whether the mentally retarded are appropriate candidates for execution in the thirteen years since Penry was decided, the Court agreed to review Atkins' death sentence. The Court heard oral arguments in the case on February 20, 2002. The ruling The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution generally forbids cruel and unusual punishments. Unlike other provisions of the Constitution, the Eighth Amendment is interpreted in light of the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." The best evidence on this score is the judgment of state legislatures. Accordingly, the Court had previously found that the death penalty was inappropriate for the crime of rape, Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), or for those convicted of felony murder who neither themselves killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill, Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). The Court found that the Eighth Amendment forbids the imposition of the death penalty in these cases because "most of the legislatures that have recently addressed the matter" have rejected the death penalty for these offenders, and the Court will generally defer to the judgments of those bodies. The Court then described how a national consensus that the mentally retarded should not be executed had emerged. In 1986, Georgia was the first state to outlaw the execution of the mentally retarded. Congress followed two years later, and the next year Maryland joined these two jurisdictions. Thus, when the Court confronted the issue in Penry in 1989, the Court could not say that a national consensus against executing the mentally retarded had emerged. Over the next twelve years, nineteen more states exempted the mentally retarded from capital punishment under their laws, bringing the total number of states to twenty-one, plus the federal government. In light of the "consistency of direction of change" toward a prohibition on the execution of the mentally retarded, and the relative rarity of such executions in states that still allow it, the Court proclaimed that a "national consensus has developed against it." The only difficulty that remains is in determining which offenders actually are mentally retarded. Also, the "relationship between mental retardation and the penological purposes served by the death penalty" justifies a conclusion that executing the mentally retarded is cruel and unusual punishment that the Eighth Amendment should forbid. In other words, unless it can be shown that executing the mentally retarded promotes the goals of retribution and deterrence, doing so is nothing more than "purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering," making the death penalty cruel and unusual in those cases. Being mentally retarded means that a person not only has substandard intellectual functioning but also significant limitations in adaptive skills such as communication, self-care, and self-direction. These deficiencies typically manifest before the age of eighteen. Although they can know the difference between right and wrong, these deficiencies mean they have a lesser ability to learn from experience, engage in logical reasoning, and understand the reactions of others. This means that inflicting the death penalty on one mentally retarded individual is less likely to deter other mentally retarded individuals from committing crimes. As for retribution, society's interest in seeing that a criminal get his "just deserts" means that the death penalty must be confined to the "most serious" of murders, not simply the average murder. The goal of retribution is not served by imposing the death penalty on a group of people who have a significantly lesser capacity to understand why they are being executed. Because the mentally retarded are not able to communicate with the same sophistication as the average offender, there is a greater likelihood that their deficiency in communicative ability will be interpreted by juries as a lack of remorse for their crimes. They typically make poor witnesses. As such, there is a greater risk that the jury may impose the death penalty despite the existence of evidence that suggests that a lesser penalty should be imposed. In light of the "evolving standards of decency" that the Eighth Amendment demands, the fact that the goals of retribution and deterrence are not served as well in the execution of the mentally retarded, and the heightened risk that the death penalty will be imposed erroneously, the Court concluded that the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution of the mentally retarded. Source External links
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