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UjebardhaBattle of Ujebardha Prelude The Battle of Ujebardha (also Albulena) was fought on 2 September 1457 and was, arguably Skanderbegs most important victory against any Ottoman army in an open field. The Albanian army had mustered approximately fifteen thousand men, while facing an Ottoman expeditionary force of seventy thousand men. Background In 1456 Sultan Mehmed II, went with a force of 150,000 soldiers against Belgrade, modern Serbia. The citadel of Belgrade, other than being a Christian stronghold, was also of a great strategic importance since it guarded Hungarys backdoor. Along with Albania, Hungary was the only European power, whose existence was threatened by the rise of Ottoman Turkey. (See also siege of Nndorfehrvr) Thanks to the intevention of a Hungarian hero Jnos (John) Hunyadi the voivode of Transylvania the city was saved and the sultan beaten. Hunyadi, however, died of plague three weeks after the victory had been achieved in August 11, 1457, which, for Skanderbeg, meant that Albania would have faced the Ottoman fury alone. Even though Hunyadi and Skanderbeg had never met, their personal struggle against the same enemy, had influenced indirectly a sort of unofficial partnership. The second battle of Kosovo in 1448 had almost seen the materialization of this partnership, had not Skanderbeg been hindered to assist Hunyadi by the despot of Serbia Đurađ Branković. Free from Hungarian pressure, Mehmed, finally, turned his attention against Albania The Commanders In spring 1457, Mehmed send against Skanderbeg a 70,000 strong force led by Isa Beg Evrenoz and Hamza Kastrioti. Evrenoz was the only Ottoman general that had ever achieved a victory over Skanderbeg, defeating him in the Siege of Berat. Accompanying him was Hamza Kastrioti, Skanderbegs nephew. Hamza has proven himself over the years, but he nurtured hopes to one day inherit the principality of Albania after Skanderbeg. His ambition proved too much for him, for when Skanderbeg fathered a child with Donika Kastrioti, he felt cheated by fate and went over to the Ottomans. The presence of these two men demonstrates that this expedition was of a vital importance for the Sultan Evrenoz, as we mentioned, was the only general to have defeated Scanderbeg. Hamza Kastrioti, on the other hand, had spent 14 years as the right hand of Skanderbeg, and new every military tactic that his uncle had ever employed in his war against the Ottomans. Also, by vanquishing Albania, the Sultan could finally resume his two-pronged attack over Europe by reaching Rome and Vienna; his proclaimed ambitions. The Battle The orders were simple: engage Scanderbeg and defeat him. Evrenoz entered the valley of Mat and proceeded slowly westwards toward Kruja. A few minor clashes ensued, after which Scanderbeg withdrew his forces. Unhindered, the Ottomans carried on, plundering the small settlement and harassing the population for information. After several weeks and no sign of Skanderbeg, Evrenoz and Hamza were induced in believing that Skanderbeg had indeed fled for his life. Sketchy reports were coming that he had lost the loyalty of the army, who had deserted him, while he, himself, was trying to cross the border over to the domains of Venice in Albania. In fact, on July 21, Marco Diedo, the Venetian governor of Durres had written to the Republics Senate that: The Magnificent Skanderbeg, deserted by all was trying to find refuge high in the mountains, while the Turk ruled supreme in Albania. In August the position of the Ottomans in Albania seemed solidified. Twenty thousand soldiers protected the supply routes, while keeping under siege the forts in Cidhna, Dibra, Guri i Bardhe (White Stone), Mat, Rodon, and Petrela. The rest of the army, fifty thousand strong, moved from the gully of Mat to Ujebardha, northwest of Kruja and south of Lezha so that both cities could be kept under watch, as well as giving the army something to do to keep morale in place. By the end of August, three months after they crossed the border, the Ottoman army seemed to have reached a level of complacency, and its vigilance had lowered significantly. On September 2, Skanderbeg made his move. The strategy was simple. Skanderbeg had to deliver a strong and surprise thrust to the main Ottoman army and destroy it before any of the additional forces that were roaming the country free could come to its relief. Indeed, so it happened. Small Albanian detachments neutralized the Ottoman patrols, while the main body of the army approached the northern side of the camp. At noon, the Ottomans were awakened from their midday sleep to find their enemy already within their camp. An infernal noise, produced by thousands of metal-clapping devices, gave the impression that they were facing a large force. Confusion settled in as the Albanian cavalry charged on from the west, while the infantry punched its way through to the center of the camp. Soon confusion turned to panic as unit commanders failed to address the situation properly. The only serious defense was mounted by Hamza Kastrioti, who knew, that not matter what had happened during the last three months, Skanderbeg could not have mustered more than 11,000 soldiers there. Indeed, Skanderbeg had placed considerable care in defeating Hamza and his sipahis first, by sending against him his personal guard of 2,000 cavalry. Hamza was being pushed back, but his retreat was ordered and sustained. This made the task even more difficult, since his resistance could bolster the courage of the Ottomans in other sectors. If this had happened, then Skanderbeg would have been defeated by the superior numbers of his enemy. But this did not happen. The thrust had achieved what Skanderbeg had planned for. Within two hours the Ottoman camp was entirely in his hand, while the remnants of the defeated army made their way through the valley of Tirana, on to Elbasan. The Ottoman causalties amounted to 20,000 dead, wounded and prisoners, whereas the Albanians lost less than 2,000. Hamza Kastrioti was captured alive, and sent to jail in Naples. He was freed later and went on his own, with his wife and children in Turkey, where he died as beggar in early 1460s. Importance The importance of the Battle of Ujebardha can hardly be understated. It reinstated Skanderbegs military genius in a time of defection and betrayals. The capture and jailing of Hamza Kastrioti was of a great symbolic significance: traitors will be punished on an equal basis regardless of their social standing and status. Also, it reaffirmed Albanias role as the one of the last defenders of Christendom in the Balkans (with the exception of Hungary). If Albania had fallen in 1457, then the invasion of Italy would have started thirteen years before it actually did, and fourteen years before the death of Mehmed II. As it was, Ujebardha bought Skanderbeg and Italy some time, which was to materialize in a three year armistice between Mehmed and Skanderbeg in 1460. In 1461 Skanderbeg started his campaign in Italy to protect his Neapolitan ally, King Ferdinand of Naples in his struggle to retain his throne from the contender house of Anjou. King Ferdinand just like his father, King Alphonse, was Skanderbegs most important ally supplying him with money, foodstuffs and modern weapons. The constant struggle in the Albania, had caused the virtual collapse of its economy, and the continuation of a close Albanian-Neapolitan cooperation was vital in the struggle against the Ottomans. L9M
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